Why Iran is holding back the axis of resistance in the war with the US and Israel

Summary

The silent axis: Why Iran isn’t using its allies US aggression against Iran has persisted for over three weeks now. Throughout this time, Tehran has acted largely on its own, without mobilizing allied forces. This raises a crucial question: what’s going on with the so-called Axis of Resistance – the extensive network of Iranian allies that took decades and billions of dollars to establish? Formally, the Axis of Resistance includes groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis (Ansar Allah movement) in Yemen, and various Shiite armed factions in Iraq, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and Kata’ib Hezbollah. The US and Israel traditionally view these groups as Iran’s proxy tools that enable it to exert asymmetric influence in the region. The West’s portrayal of Hamas as an Iranian proxy, however, is fundamentally misleading. Despite periods of tactical alignment and shared interests, Hamas has historically maintained decision-making autonomy and has often found itself at odds with Tehran – most notably during the Syrian conflict, when their positions diverged significantly, even leading to direct confrontations. In short, the relationship between Hamas and Iran is more of a situational partnership than an alliance. Apparently, Washington operated under the assumption that elements of the Axis of Resistance have been significantly weakened or even neutralized. Indeed, over the past couple of years, Israel has systematically targeted the infrastructure and command structures of these groups in Syria and Lebanon; intelligence operations also sought to undermine their overall operational capabilities in Iraq and their coordination with Iran. However, interpreting these developments as evidence of the destruction of the Axis of Resistance may be premature and superficial. Rather, Iran is deliberately resorting to a strategy of restrained escalation. It seems Iran is avoiding the direct involvement of its allies in the conflict, aiming to localize the confrontation and prevent it from spiraling into a full-scale regional war, which would carry exorbitant costs for all involved. Moreover, the nature of the Axis of Resistance does not imply automatic and synchronized engagement of all its components in every crisis. These actors possess a degree of autonomy and operate based on their national and organizational interests, as well as the prevailing military-political situation. Against this backdrop, a more sensitive question is emerging in Washington and West Jerusalem: what if Iran hasn’t just weathered the storm but has actually adapted to the harsh conditions of escalating tensions? Despite suffering severe losses from the very first days of the conflict – including the elimination of its top political and military leadership, key decision-makers, and significant portions of the command structure within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the armed forces – Iran’s system has shown remarkable institutional resilience. This hardly surprises those familiar with Iranian domestic politics. The mechanisms for personnel rotation, deeply embedded into Iran’s political and military architecture, continue to function effectively, ensuring continuity in governance and command structures. In other words, this is not a personalist regime vulnerable to ‘decapitation’ strikes, but rather a system characterized by high organizational inertia and adaptability. Iran not only maintains its strategic stability but also demonstrates an ability to independently wage war against a significantly superior adversary – specifically, the US and the US-Israel alliance. The blocking of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical energy chokepoint, serves not just as a military tool but as a geo-economic pressure point that impacts global markets, increasing the costs of further escalation. The situation compels the US to reluctantly admit Iran’s dominance in this area, whatever Trump may say about it. Additionally, the psychological dynamics of the conflict have shifted. While early on there were indications that Tehran sought de-escalation, it now appears that Iranian leadership has entered ‘conflict mode’ and adapted accordingly. Experts note that Iran perceives its ability to withstand pressure as a factor that expands its room for maneuvering. Whereas US rhetoric includes threats of escalating confrontations – potentially involving ground operations or seizing strategically important targets like Kharg Island – Iran demonstrates composure, believing that the potential for escalation is far from exhausted. In this context, the strategy of ‘deferred engagement’ of allies becomes particularly valuable. According to sources cited by The Wall Street Journal, both the US and Israel are currently trying to avoid actions that might provoke Yemen’s Houthis to directly join the conflict on Iran’s side. These concerns are well-founded: the potential closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would create additional shocks to global energy logistics, linking the crisis in the Persian Gulf with the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is making diplomatic efforts to curb escalation, appealing to previously established agreements with the Houthis regarding non-aggression. However, Houthi representatives signal a continued strategic uncertainty; according to Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the political bureau of the Houthis, coordination with Tehran is ongoing, and the question of military support remains one of timing and feasibility. Just like other elements of the Axis of Resistance, the Houthis strive to avoid the image of being mere proxy actors serving external interests. However, if Iran faces a situation where it can no longer manage alone, it will undoubtedly turn to its allies for support. This illustrates Iran’s ability to mobilize these resources at will – either to exert intense pressure or as a strategic asset in future negotiations. In other words, the current landscape increasingly resembles a multi-layered Persian game of endurance and controlled escalation. Iran demonstrates both a capacity to withstand pressure and an ability to redistribute risks while retaining the key element of uncertainty – the potential to escalate a ‘local’ conflict into a full-blown regional crisis at any moment. This unpredictability has become a significant factor in deterring its adversaries. From a rational and military-political standpoint, Iran’s reluctance to immediately deploy the full range of its capabilities should not be seen as a sign of weakness, but rather as a calculated strategy of managed escalation. In asymmetric conflicts, prematurely revealing all one’s cards eliminates the crucial factor of uncertainty, which itself serves as a deterrent and a means of pressuring the opponent. Most likely, Washington and West Jerusalem assumed that the initial strikes would trigger an impulsive reaction from Tehran, fueled by chaos within its highest echelons and a lack of direction. They expected Iran to instantly mobilize its entire network of allies and proxies. However, in practice, Iran is demonstrating the opposite behavior: a phased and measured application of force while keeping key assets in reserve. Essentially, in this multi-tiered strategy, Tehran simultaneously addresses several objectives: preserving strategic reserves without fully disclosing the potential of its allied actors and its own capabilities. Iran employs geo-economic levers, including control over vital transportation and energy routes. Additionally, it maintains domestic stability by identifying covert networks and minimizing destabilizing factors within the country. At the same time, Tehran engages in diplomatic maneuvers, leaving room for negotiation while gradually raising the stakes and forcing its opponents to act amid growing uncertainty. This approach aligns with the classic logic of strategic patience: the opponent is compelled to react, but remains in the dark about the enemy’s untapped resources. The behavior of Iran’s allies is particularly significant in this regard. Observing Tehran’s resilience sends them a signal that they are dealing not with a weakened actor, but with a center of power capable of enduring pressure and maintaining control. In this context, their potential involvement is postponed until it can be used to achieve maximum impact – either as a decisive factor in the escalation process or as leverage in negotiations. In this context, Iran’s strategy resembles the old Persian game of Nard: this complex table game (an ancestor of backgammon) is characterized by a high degree of variability. At first glance, Tehran’s actions might seem limited or even restrained; however, they are calculated to achieve cumulative impact and exploit the critical vulnerabilities of adversaries. One of their major vulnerabilities is global logistics and energy infrastructure. The potential blockade of other transportation hubs could trigger a systemic shock to the world economy. Moreover, unlike large-scale military confrontations, such measures can inflict considerable damage without necessitating the transition to more destructive scenarios that come at a high human cost. This is why Iran has spent decades building a distributed network of influence and tools of indirect leverage. Under existential pressure, this architecture transforms into a mechanism that ensures strategic depth and flexibility, allowing Iran to vary the intensity of conflict, redistribute risks, and target its opponents not just on the battlefield but also through economic and infrastructural channels. Tehran’s current approach is not an improvisation but a long-term strategy based on the principle that maximum effectiveness is achieved not by a sudden show of force but by applying force in a measured and unpredictable way, targeting the adversary’s most vulnerable points.