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A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
For subscribers A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance A coalition of countries could help protect freedom of navigation and reduce the risk of future disruptions. Sign up now: Get ST's newsletters delivered to your inbox The world breathed a huge sigh of relief following recent reports that an interim Iran-US understanding may reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical international waterway for international trade in petroleum and its derivatives, including fertilisers. The “double blockades” by the US and Iran reduced Persian Gulf exports to a trickle and dramatically raised oil prices across the world. This economic fallout has been damaging, particularly for countries without deep pockets or large stored petroleum reserves. One, the Philippines, declared a national emergency. As welcome as it is, simply reopening Hormuz is only a starting point. Shipping traffic is likely to remain constrained until de-mining is completed and commercial confidence returns. For a return to the pre-war traffic norm, producers, traders, shippers, bankers and insurance companies will have to be confident that impediments or closures will not recur. None will want to risk ships trapped again in a geopolitical confrontation. Rebuilding confidence will not come quickly or easily. The surprise attack on Iran, the Iranian response to block the strait and the later US counter-blockade on Iran all demonstrated how vulnerable Hormuz is to closure and the use of coercion. Moreover, Iran continues to insist on a new strait regime and the imposition of fees on ships, albeit in cooperation with Gulf partners. One way to reduce that vulnerability is to create an organised international diplomatic coalition of countries dependent on Hormuz for trade and energy supplies which can play a role in ensuring that Hormuz, like all other international straits, remains free and open to international shipping. This may be particularly important if Iran’s commitment to reopen under any signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) is limited. International law provides the framework The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which went into force in 1994, sets out the legal framework governing international straits. There are more than 100 of such straits, but only a handful are truly critical to global commerce – like Gibraltar, Dover, Hormuz, and Bab al-Mandab at the southern end of the Red Sea. UNCLOS extended to 12 nautical miles the territorial sea over which coastal states exercise full sovereignty, but required coastal states to honour transit passage through international straits. Coastal states can delineate channels of navigation and set pollution standards, but they cannot inhibit, suspend or discriminate against shipping of any country, or charge tolls or fees. A total of 168 nation-state parties have ratified UNCLOS. Iran objected to aspects of this transit passage regime. Objecting is a legitimate right but trying to force an exception to what all other countries have agreed to is not. The US, while a coastal state that has not ratified UNCLOS, accepts transit provisions and freedom of navigation more generally as customary sea law. International law gives all UNCLOS parties rights in all international straits. These cannot be abrogated by one country alone or even two. But international law can be easily violated unless protected. Although the closure of Hormuz violated the rights of user states and some, including China, individually protested, there was no concerted effort by users to organise a coalition, assert their rights and diplomatically push for reopening of the strait. That does not have to happen again. A Hormuz Users Group A “Hormuz Users Group” could help strengthen compliance with sea law by creating a standing diplomatic coalition of countries that rely on the strait. One important function is to draw attention to the international consensus that such straits are considered global assets with multiple stakeholders having passage rights but not sovereignty. It can help foreign ministries explain this to more narrowly interested domestic groups that do not have experience in international law or commerce. Second, the group would be prepared in the event of a disruption to convene immediate consultations and develop a coordinated plan of diplomatic action. Third, by having an established support mechanism for freedom of navigation, the coalition would strengthen private-sector user confidence by creating a sense of predictability about the strait regime and its broad support base. Had such a group been in existence when the Iran-US conflict broke out, it might not have prevented closures but could have given the mediation effort added diplomatic heft needed for an earlier reopening. It could be organised and chaired by one or more of the countries that led the UNCLOS negotiations, such as Malta or Singapore. It should also include large countries that have ratified and thus have rights under UNCLOS such as China, India and Russia as well as regional groupings like ASEAN and the European Union. If a critical mass of 25 partners, mostly from Asia and Africa, can be quietly and quickly assembled, it might spark a rush to join, adding real diplomatic weight to the group. The larger the group, the more countries likely to have influence with Iran or the US. Hopefully, it could be in existence when the MOU expires. While the primary purpose of the users group is to safeguard navigation rights in Hormuz, it could be useful in other related tasks in the Persian Gulf. The most immediate reopening task is to de-mine the strait. Some countries with de-mining capabilities have offered to help, and the users group could mobilise more contributions. The faster de-mining occurs, the more quickly traffic can begin to return towards pre-war levels and limit longer-term damage. More speculative but potentially transformational is post-war economic collaboration with Iran. If there are sanctions relief and investment cooperation, as some versions of the MOU suggest, Iran may be open to joint, mutually beneficial ventures. A users group could help mobilise resources and expertise to help Iran make the best use of its natural endowments in promising ways, including modernising ports, providing logistics services and establishing recreational facilities. Singapore, in fact, provides an excellent model of how a port city astride an international strait can derive sustained benefit while facilitating free navigation and trade. Iran’s deep hinterland and large natural and human resource base should give it significant advantages, especially if it is working cooperatively with Persian Gulf neighbours and other maritime states. Iran and the US both have reason to claim to have won the war. But as is often said, the real measure of success comes in winning the peace. If the new Iranian leadership is less revolutionary and more technocratic and pragmatic as some observers of Iran believe, there may be real promise for a new and more stable order in the Middle East. That is still a distant vision in the future, but hopefully an open, free and prospering Hormuz can be a station on the way. This is a global, not bilateral or even regional, task. Charles E. Morrison is senior fellow and former president of the East-West Center.
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance
A free and open Strait of Hormuz can’t be left to chance