Israel needs more than military force to counter Iran and its proxies | The Jerusalem Post

Summary

The latest round of confrontation with Iran once again demonstrates the determination of the regime not only to avoid capitulation, but also to continue fighting for its interests and national honor. Following the unexpected loss of Syria, the regime is making every effort to project control and coordination with its remaining proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shi’ite militias in Iraq. This coordination is intended to signal that despite the severe blows suffered by the “Axis of Resistance,” it continues to play a role in the struggle against the United States, Israel, and their allies. Israel’s response so far has been that what has not been achieved through force will be achieved through greater force – unless, of course, US President Donald Trump stops it. One quote attributed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a cabinet meeting preceding the June 2025 attack on Iran (Operation Roaring Lion) was that “only force works, when they fear you.” But what happens when force does not intimidate the enemy, as in the case of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis? Then greater force is applied. This solution, as has already been demonstrated in conflicts with states and organizations driven by fervent religious or nationalist ideologies and determined not to surrender – a situation perceived by them as worse than death – does not produce a “final victory.” This happened to the Americans in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq; it happened to the Soviets in Afghanistan; and it will most likely happen to Putin in Ukraine as well. So, is there a solution, and if so, what is it? The first step is recognition that conflicts of this kind do not end with a quick decisive blow. They take time. Second, there is a possibility that they will not end at all, but rather continue at varying levels of intensity. Yet there is a third path: adopting an indirect and covert approach that employs subversion and maneuvering to destabilize the enemy from within, to weaken it and, perhaps in the long term, even toppling it. In practice, this method has been used mainly against Iran. The logic behind focusing on Iran is that a substantial blow to the heart (Iran) would also critically damage the limbs (the proxies). For years, the Mossad operated both inside and outside Iran to sabotage its nuclear development – including assassinations of nuclear scientists. This framework also includes Mossad activity inside Iran and among the Kurds aimed at advancing regime change. Despite many tactical successes, the ultimate goals – preventing a nuclear Iran or toppling the regime – have not been achieved yet, partly due to an underestimation of the difficulty of the mission on the one hand, and an overestimation of Kurdish willingness to fight the regime on the other. Thus, the objective should be to weaken the proxies – but by different means. In fact, the transformation that took place in Syria and led to its removal from the circle of proxies may serve as a case study, insofar as it was primarily the outcome of an internal process that began with the 2011 uprising, while Israel contributed by weakening the regime. In other words, the process must be internal, with Israel assisting it through means tailored to each specific arena. Confronting Hezbollah The principal challenge is Hezbollah. As long as Israel occupies Lebanese territory there, it fuels the organization’s ideology, reinforcing its narrative as the “protector of Lebanon.” Israel should assist the internal Lebanese process aimed at limiting Hezbollah’s power. The shift in Lebanese discourse regarding a settlement with Israel is dramatic, particularly since it is being led by the president and the government. This is a process that should enlist regional states along with the international community and its institutions, including the United States, the European Union, and the World Bank. Any effort to curtail Hezbollah’s power must encompass far more than simply disarming the organization and supplying more weapons to the Lebanese army; it requires a comprehensive, long-term political and diplomatic strategy. Israel should persist in attempts to reach an agreement with the official Lebanese state, thereby driving a wedge between it and Hezbollah. An Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon could be quietly presented as conditional upon Hezbollah’s disarmament, thereby creating a “political horizon” for official Lebanon, while Shi’ites displaced from villages in the south would most probably apply pressure on Hezbollah. At present, the Lebanese army is incapable of disarming Hezbollah. To this end, it must be strengthened with manpower and advanced equipment. A combination of Western weaponry financed by Gulf money, together with training of units in Jordan or Egypt, could provide a viable solution. The ultimate goal is not merely to strengthen the army militarily, but to transform it into an institution capable of carrying out the basic functions of a state military controlling territory; a body trusted by both sides; and financially attractive to recruits (today, for example, a Hezbollah operative earns far more than a Lebanese soldier). The key constituency is the Shi’ite community, and the key figure is Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal movement. Whereas Berri previously fully supported Hezbollah’s position, signs of fissures within the Shi’ite community are now emerging. This process should be strengthened to produce an attractive alternative to Hezbollah infrastructure. Israel and the international community can support this process by providing financial and logistical assistance for rebuilding the south, in contrast to what Hezbollah did with Iranian money after 2006. Hezbollah is not only missiles and weapons – it also consists of banks, clinics, subsidized supermarkets, schools, and more. The entry of the Lebanese state into this vacuum, in cooperation with Shi’ite actors outside Hezbollah, is the key. Such an Israeli policy in Lebanon and Yemen would operate below the radar and would not provoke the antagonism generated by the overt and blunt use of military power. There is a strong likelihood that, in the long term, the results of such a policy would prove more beneficial from both Israeli and regional perspectives. Such a strategy could also help Israel reintegrate into the region after once again becoming a “pariah state.” In this sense, “less force” may ultimately produce “more power” – but this time, diplomatically. Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security. Eitan Yishai is a PhD candidate at the Hebrew University, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Mitvim, and a Lebanon expert.